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'riminality Is a Disease and Criminals Can Be Cured."
AN ATTEMPT AT A RE-EVALUATION OF SOME
CONCEPTS OF LAW AND PSYCHIATRY
Benjamin Karpman
Dr. Karpman is the Chief Psychotherapist at St. Elizabeth's Hospital and has
been associated with that institution for twenty-eight years. He was Professor and
Head of Psychiatry at Howard University Medical School from 1921 to 1941 and
has published numerous studies on the psychogenetic aspects of neuroses and criminality. Ip is author of a volume on The Individual Criminal and a series of studies,
Case Studies in the Psychopathology of Crime, two volumes of which have already
been published. Volumes III and IV are to appear early in 1947.
In the present study the author emphasizes the need for reconsidering certain
problems common to both law and psychiatry in the light of the more progressive
trends. He submits that the emphasis should be laid on the doer and not on the
deed, on deeper emotional motivations rather than immediate causation, and on the
early environmental setting in which the criminal was brought up. He further submits that it is both desirable and necessary to re-evaluate the entire concept of right
and wrong, tracing the same to the origin and lifetime development of the individual, that greater consideration should be given to emotional rather than intellectual
factors and that criminals should be charged on the basis of their total life development rather than on the type of crime committed. On the basis of all of the above,
he submits a two-fold division of criminals and a differential treatment on the
basis of this division.-EDITOR.

Man's mind is incurably a compulsive mind. It is a restless
mind, always asking questions, seeking problems, and craving
answers; confronted with a fact, it looks for a cause. Hence
religion which attempts to give us something definitive about
that which is basically infinite; hence science which attempts to
satisfy a curiosity that is forever insatiable; hence medicine
and medical research which seek a cure on a basis of known
causes.
Withal, the human mind is equally limited and, for the most
part perhaps, superficial. All too often, as soon as an answer
to the question is given, it ceases searching for further answers.
If a fact is explained in terms of an immediate cause, it ceases
to search for deeper causations. Yet the history of mankind has
long taught us that behind an immediate cause there is universally a preceding cause, behind which there is a still deeper cause;
perhaps there are many deeper causes. In particular, we often
fail to recognize the fact that a phenomenon may not have an
inunediate, clearly demonstrable cause, but may be the result
of many little causes, each in itself not significant as a direct
determining factor in the final phenomenon, yet alf these causes,
in totality, providing the large background from which the
phenomenon has emerged. And so it happens, for instance, in
our political or international life, that a war may start seemingly
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from very trivial causes, yet in historical perspective it be,',,fes
clearly evident that these trivial causes were only curtain
phenomena, and that back of these there have been many contributing factors going deeply and remotely into the national
and political life of the belligerent nations, which explain more
fully and adequately the phenomenon of war. Likewise in medicine where some diseases are unquestionably diie to major cause;
yet here, too, we are often confronted with diseases which start
from an insignificant agent or no ascertainable cause at all, yet
may lead to profound bodily disturbances.
Now, this is the situation with criminality, as it is quite universally with other human phenomena. An individual commits
a crime, seemingly for a very simple reason. He stole money
because he needed it; or he killed a rival for the affection of a
loved woman; or he violated our moral sense because perverselv
he wished to indulge in sexual behavior which is regarded as
immoral and abnormal. These would seem to be the immediate
motives, if motives they can be called. And yet, if one is not
satisfied with a mere cross-section but attempts to look deeper
into the causation, he may discover, as he goes further, a great
multiplicity of factors streaming from different directions, all
having combined to emerge through one particular act which in
itself is insignificant except in a symbolic sense, as an indicator
of underlying problems.
It is a frequent observation that two disciplines dealing with
the same -material, but from different angles, often develop not
only different approaches but even different technical languages
as well, so that in time they come not even to understand each
other. It is just such a situation which appears to have developed between law and psychiatry in dealing with crime. No clear
understanding will ever come between the two unless they are
interpreted to each other; just as one translates one language
into another. It is in the hope of contributing somewhat to a
better rapprochement between the two disciplines that the
following considerations are offered.
The Deed vs/and/or the Doer
One of the severest limitations that still exist in modern law
is the concept that so rigidly separates the deed from the doer;
more specifically, the crime from the criminal. We pay but little
attention to the criminal as an individual. This is even noticeable in criminal semantics. We speak of petty and grand larceny,
or of mayhem but we do not have a corresponding noun for these,
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such as grand larcenist or inabemist. The word murder includeall degrees and types; murder, homicide, second degree murdet,
manslaughter, etc. but there are no corresponding nouns for
the various degrees. This situation often develops absurdities.
A man steals a case of whiskey with a retail value of $65.00 and
is charged with grand larceny, which is a felony. The defense
lawyer, however, contends that the wholesale price of the goods
is only $48.00, which brings the crime within the range of petty
larceny, which is a misdemeanor. The argument is unanswerable
and the original indictment can not be sustained. Nothing, however, is said of the thief 'himself. When committing the crime,
lie did not, it seems, consider that he was committing grand or
petty larceny; he was committing larceny. His intent was to
get the case of whiskey, be it grand or petty larceny. Intent gets
closer to motivation than the mere size of the loot; but thoug],
it is recognized in both cases, it is not differential. In all reason
he should be charged on the basis of the executed[ criminal intent
rather than on the size of the crime. The law, however, emphasizes the result of crime rather than degree of intent. But in
any criminal indictment, while intent is recognized, degrees of
intent are less emphasized than degrees and gradations of crime.
Or let us take the instance of John A., who fires several shots
at William B. with the obvious intention of killing him. He only
succeeded, however, in injuring him, and he is charged with
aggravated assault, for which he gets a sentence of, say, five
years. Had he succeeded in his original aim, he would have been
charged with first degree murder and punished accordingly. In
either situation, however, his full intent was to kill; he was a
murderer in every sense of the word; it was by sheer accident
that he failed of his purpose. Yet the punishment is neatly
differentiated on the basis of results rather than intent.
But why should we be at all concerned with the doer instead
of merely taking care of the deed at its face value? After all,
so it is maintained, society's prime concern is with results, with
acts as they affect the life of the community, and the effect is
the same whatever causes may be back of the act. What indeed
is the relationship, if there be any, between the deed and the
doer? It is our contention that, be it a social deed or only a
personal reaction, it is no more possible to treat satisfactorily
the deed without considering the doer, than it is possible to
treat a symptom without consideriig the disease that produced
it. To a physician the deed has the same relationship to the doer
as a symptom of a disease has to the disease as such. In early
days, medicine was obliged to treat disease by symptoms only,
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for it did not know the pathology back of it. Modern medicine.
however, is not satisfied with the treatment of symptoms as
such, but instead attempts to treat the disease that is responsible
for it. For, from its point of view, the symptom is merely the
particular point at which a great many factors streaming from
different directions, each one having an origin and significanee
of its own, become confluent. Obviously, in order to do away
with an annoying symptom, one must take into consid-ration all
factors that have gone into its making. Thus, 100 years ago, we
used to treat headache by a few established home remedies (and
we do to a large extent even today). It was a blind treatment, a
stab in the dark, as it were, and sometimes it worked and then
again it did not. By this time, however, we know what a complicated symptom headache may be. It may be entirely an expression of some inflammation of the coverings of the brain. It may
be due to some disease of the internal matter of the brain itself
or its blood vessels, or it may be due to an expression of some
particular psychological difficulties when the head aches with
conflicts. Obviously, to treat all these headaches in the same
manner would be fallacious, for while the remedy may reach one
kind of headache it cannot possibly, by reason of the different
pathology present, reach another type of headache. We therefore make a differential diagnosis and try to figure out the
nature of the headache, and the type of remedy suitable for it.
Or let us say there is a skin eruption. One can of course
scrape it off, or put a salve on it. The salve may clear up the
eruption, but as soon as the application of salve is removed,
the eruption comes back. This is due to the fact that, although
the skin eruption is on the surface of the body, its basic cause
is entirely internal, a product of disturbed metabolism, and not
until the physician learns, by various tests at his disposal, the
internal cause of the skin condition will he ever be able to do
away with it.
Too, it must be remembered that treatment of a headache, skin
eruption or any other symptom, symptomatically can at best be
only palliative. As often as headache recurrs, the particular
medicine must be taken which only temporarily relieves the
headache, but does not reach the basic source of it. It is, therefore, an endless proposition, whereas, on the other hand, if we
know the basic cause of it, we can by radical treatment cure it
and thus stop the headache altogether.
In like manner we view the deed. It is, as we see it, the
surface expression of a large number of factors, some external
to the individual, but for the most part entirely internal and
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having a long history. No deed can be understood unless the
psychology of the doer is understood. And society, which is
concerned with the abolition of deeds, will never accomplish that
as long as it deals with the deed only. Hence, because of the
system of punishing the deed and not the doer, crime has never
abated and goes on from year to year, increasing in severity.
A most radical change is needed; one must reach the deed
through the doer.
Causation vs./and/or Motivation
Just as in criminal law the deed is regarded as being more
important than the doer, so is causation considered more important than motivation. Causation refers chiefly to factors
external to the individual responsible for the effect produced.
Thus we speak of the effect of physical, economic, and general
factors as causative factors in crime. Motivation, on the other
hand, refers to factors which spring from the inner life of the
individual, stimulating him to act in a particular way; it refers
chiefly to inner psychological mainsprings in human behavior.
The consideration of causative factors does not give us a clue
as to why one of two men living in the same community and
under apparently identical social conditions, becomes a habitual
criminal while the other develops into a upright citizen and
much respected member of the community. Only a study of
their inner lives could reveal to us the true personal reasons
for the difference in their behavior; only this knowledge can
help us to understand the meaning of the crime for the criminal
and the community, and how to dispose of it. And in any event,
be it a question of causation or motivation, little more is sought
in any criminal trial than the most immediate causation or
motive. It is recognized as an established principle in law that
motive does not enter into any crime as an essential ingredient,
though it may be inquired into. Neither the failure to prove
any motive, nor even furnishing proof of a good motive, will
prevent conviction. In the case of a man charged with the
murder of his wife or of the other man because of jealousy, he
may be freed entirely if the unwritten law is invoked, or he may
be charged with second degree murder and get from 20 years
to life. In no instance, however, does the motivation go beyond
the statement of jealousy which may mean any number of things.
Yet in terms of deeper motivations, understandable only in the
light of the man's developmental psychology, another man may
have had far greater justification for committing murder than
did this one who did the killing in a more premeditated way
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and in the belief that the unwritten law will free him, which in
fact it did.
The Setting
Another consideration is that extremely little attention is
given to the best indicator of criminal dynaanics, namely the
setting in which the crime has been committed, and more particularly the basic origins from which criminal behavior is de
rived. While the search for motives is, as a rule, neglected when
a cause of crime is looked for, the emphasis is on immediate
rather than remote motivation and a specific individual motivation at that, disregarding the multitude of circumstances that
preceded it and went directly into its making. Yet it is a fact
that very often single, definite, specific motivations in criminal
behavior cannot be found, but rather an accumulation of many
minute influences which, in totality, produce the effects noted.
In the words of many of my patients, the influence is not specific
but general and "atmospheric". This indeed is also true of
many cases of neuroses in which no specific trauma can be
pointed to as the cause of the neurosis, but the etiology must
be sought in the many varied minute influences that finally bring
about the neurosis. It is true for that matter of normal people
when the development of the personality-make-up and traits of
the individual can not be traced to any specific environmental
situations and effects but rather to subtle but continuous influences that pervaded and permeated one's environment and
development.
Right and Wrong: Responsibility
But why need we be concerned at all with the motivations
behind the crime and the setting in Which it has been committed?
Because they have an important bearing in the consideration of
right and wrong, and the problem of responsibility, both being
essential in determining the legal and social disposition of the
case. For neither the knowledge of right or wrong, nor the
feeling of responsibility, are abstract terms that appear in a
vacuum. Nor yet are they immediate and spontaneous reactions
that suddenly appear on the scene in response to a definite
situation. On the contrary, they are human expressions that
have a long history and evolution, a history as long as the
development of the individual himself. From our point of view,
it is not sufficient to say that the defendant knows or does not
know the difference between right and wrong (and in some
jurisdictions, whether he can adhere to it), or that he is guilty
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or not guilty, partly responsible or not at all responsible, but
whether lie can choose emotionally right from wrong; why, and
to what extent lie is guilty and why and to what extent he is
responsible. An individual, and presumably a sane individual,
may indeed know intellectually the difference between right and
wrong, yet be wholly unable to choose emotionally the right, the
emotional forces within him driving him irresistibly toward
the wrong.
Total or even partial guilt and responsibility as viewed by
law can not be determined by the consideration of the external
factors of the case but only in the light of the individual defendant's own history and development. The individual must
be considered first and not his crime, which is only a pale symbol
of him. That is to say, regardless of what his present knowledge
of right and wrong may be, what his guilt or responsibility may
appear in the present cross section when charged with crime,
we must go back to his life history-what sort of guilt feelings
and sense of responsibility did he have long before the commission of the crime, and what were the forces that controlled
their expression, blocking at times the operation of his conscience and guilt sense and allowing the commission of the crime.
When we have a knowledge of all these situations, our entire
treatment of the criminal will change. From the time of Beggaria and Bentham, we have been guided by the principle of
"let the punishment fit the crime." Because of the universality
of these concepts, which at the same time are obviously antiquated, it becomes important to investigate these more closely.
We submit as a more correct formulation, "let the punishment
fit the criminal" or even "let the treatment fit the criminal,"
for punishment is only one of the many treatments possible, and
by no means the most effective or deterrent. And to paraphrase
that great lawyer and humanitarian, Clarence Darrow, "I hate
crime, but never the criminal."
Intellectual vs. Emotional Knowledge
In all discussion of right and wrong, and responsibility, the
tacit underlying assumption is that we are dealing entirely with
motives at the intellectual level, that every member of the community, unless he be definitely insane or feebleminded, has a
perfect and clear-cut knowledge of right and wrong, and responsibilitv. This conception has been challenged by modern psychiatry. On the basis of undeniable and overwhelming clinical
evidence, it has been proven that human behavior is basically
emotionally conditioned and that intellectual activities are emo-
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tionallv determined. We are basically emotional, not reasoning
beings. A man born and raised in the Southi, in a family atmosphere steeped in the traditions of the Demiocratic party, will
have no difficulty in furnishing any number of valid intellectual
reasons why democratic principles are superior to those of any
other party. Likewise, an individual born and raised in Maine
or Vernmont in the best Republican traditions can offer equally
cogent arguments proving what to him is beyond any peradventure of doubt, that the Republican party is the mainstay of our
country.
Yet can any dispassionate and objective observer doubt for a
moment that in both these gentlemen the intelligence is merely
a tool and a vehicle through which is expressed the language of
the underlying emotions. Could they speak any other language,
could they escape the emotional influence of their early environment which began to work on their little minds when they could
offer no resistance but all they could do was to absorb influences.
The pre-war. Japanese was convinced against all reason that the
Emperor was divine, a proposition which to him was axiomatic
and admitted of no doubt or argument. This was because from
the earliest childhood he was emotionally influenced to think
that way when his reason has not yet developed to a point that
he could see the unreasonableness of it and contradict it. And
that which is trained in us from childhood becomes emotionally
fixed, solidified, structuralized; and it is virtually impossible to
change such an influence except perhaps through some other set
of powerful emotional influences. Thus as Japan lost the war,
it shook to its foundations the belief of the Japanese in the
divine power of the Emperor. It made them feel very insecureand insecurity is a powerful emotional reaction-and now they
look to America as a symbol of security. Hence, pictures of
Hirohito disappear from their newspapers and in their place
we have pictures of General MacArthur and other Americans.
Who then can doubt that our intelligence is basically influenced
by underlying emotions?
Two Chief Types of Criminals
If there be, therefore, any validity in our contention that the
consideration of the doer is more important than the consideration of the deed, then we disregard the technical legal considerations of crime, but instead view crime from the standpoint of
the types of personalities involved. Thus, surveying crime as a
whole, not from its surface behavior, but from its deeper motivations, especially against its background and setting, two clearly
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(lefhicd typ'es of crime seem to emerge. One would appear to be
coliiiiitted on a purely mercenary, predatory basis. Take if you
will, the immediate causations, or if you choose, go as far back
as vou can into the life of such a criminal and the most you can
uncover is a life of predation and parasitism. We may call this
the psychopathic type of criminal. And there is another type of
criminal, who in terms of crime as such, may have committed
the same crime, yet even a brief search may reveal definite
psychological reasons that often are deeply tied with the emotional life of the individual. This is the psychogenic type of
criminal. Superficially, the two types may seem very much
alike. One might say: "If I am robbed, hurt or killed, it makes
little difference to me, in terms of its ultimate effect on me, as
to the particular motive the offender may have had in committing the crime." This indeed is true. But the offender is also a
member of the community and as such has certain rights and
privileges which he cannot be deinied. In a large sense, society
has produced him and is therefore in a sense responsible for
him. Yet society may even have interests in the situation that
go beyond the immediate interests of the victim and/or the
criminal as individual members of the community; it must consider the larger needs of the community as such. There is foremost here the problem of disposition of the case. Punishment is
not enough! Punishment will not restore stolen property, nor
return to wife and children a man who has been killed, nor yet
re-establish in the woman victim of rape the consciousness of
unviolated chastity. It is even doubtful whether it acts as a
deterrent as seen from the rising rate of crime. But to know
how to dispose of a case, more than mere knowledge of the
man s surface behavior is needed. We need to know all we can
about him: the type of family he was born in, for that, no doubt,
influences his subsequent behavior; his development at a period
of life when he could have no control over his developing moral
sense and his emotional make-up. For, as Wordsworth truly
said, "the child is the father of the man." And can a child be
held responsible for having been influenced in the way he was
influenced at a highly impressionable age when he could neither
choose his influences nor control their effect on him?
Supposing then that we tentatively divide criminality and
criminals into two main groups: psychopathic and psychogenic.
It isn't difficult to cite instances from actual experiences indicating the chief differences between the two types. Here is a
man who is engaged in stealing. He prizes his theft in proportion to the value of the loot obtained; that and no more. He
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has no relation whatever to the victim. He has neither pi% ,nor
hate for the victim. Though the victim may suffer privation
because of the theft, the thief never stopped to reflect on that.
let alone identifying himself with the victim, whom lie does not
even regard in the light of a victim, if he regards him at all.
This is how he acted and behaved all his life; this is the psychopathic thief and robber.
In contrast to him, is another man who, too, steals. He happens to concentrate his thefts on jewelry to the exclusion of
everything else. Does he dispose of his jewelry and convert it
into cash? Not at all! He keeps it at home where he has by
now a large accumulation of gems. Every now and then, in tile
manner of the proverbial miser, he takes out his jewelry and
stares at it for long periods of time as if enchanted or intoxicated. Dispose of it! Never! These gems have a strong emotional value to him. They take him back emotionally to the time
of his early childhood when he saw his mother carefully putting
away her jewels lest someone steal them. Symbolically, he steals
his mother's jewelry and thus shares with her things that are
most precious to her. In this way he feels he gets closer to her
and re-animates the old memories of her. This is the psychogenic criminal.
Contrast a man who will set fire to his establishment because
lie expects to collect insurance money which he needs so badlythe motive here would seem to be psychopathic-with another
individual who will set fire to house after house, out of revenge
for betrayal, or as a form of protest against particular iniquities
-that is the psychogenic. So it is also in the case of murder.
One man will kill for money while one will kill because of unrequited love or undischarged hate. Likewise, too, are the cases
of white slavery wherein we find individuals who engage in it
solely for the profit in it, as against those who will resort to it
for any emotional reasons they may have at the time. It is
conceivable that, as time goes on and we search deeper and
deeper into the basic motivations of criminal behavior, the differences separating these two types may become more obvious.
A Plea for Differential Treatment of Criminals
In any event, can society treat these two types of criminals
alike? Certainly not! The psychogenic cases should be treated,
for they can be cured, as many have been. The psychopathic
cases, however, at least in the present state of our knowledge,
are not approachable by psychotherapy or some other form of
dealing or treatment; these must be devised. It is primarily in
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ie interest of society much nmore than in the interest of 'fie
individual that before any decision be nade as to lisposition, a
ni,,re1 carelul and thorough study he made of the entire situation.
This is the niethiod of medicine as a profession, the scientific
apiroach, in the long run the only approach that can truly
solve the problem of crime.
In Summary
It is essential that law dealing with the more formal social
aspects of crime, and psychiatry dealing with the human motives
behind criminal behavior, pool their respective resources and
approaches, so that out of this there may develop superior
methods of dealing with the problem. For in spite of all measures and methods heretofore and presently used, crime seems
to show no signs of abatement, but, on the contrary, grows more
acutely every day. Dynamic psychiatry therefore offers the
following considerations:
1. Emphasis should be laid primarily on the doer and not on
the deed.
2. Prime consideration should be given to deeper emotional
motivations behind the crime, and assign immediate causation
a secondary importance.
3. The setting in which the crime has been committed is important, but more important yet is the environmental setting in
which the criminal was brought up and developed as a child
and/or an individual.
4. It is fallacious to assume that everybody*knows exactly
what is right and what is wrong, and thus charge everyone with
full and equal responsibility. It is submitted here that due consideration must be given to the origin and life-time development
of the right and wrong attitudes in each accused individual on
the basis of which the degree of guilt and responsibility may be
more correctly evaluated.
5. In the light of advanced psychiatric knowledge, our behavior and our knowledge are determined basically more by
emottonal than intellectual considerations.
6. Rather than to treat and charge individuals with this or
that type of crime, it is more correct to view criminals in terms
of the type of personalities involved. On this basis, criminals
may be divided into two main classes: The psychogenic and
psychopathic, respectively.
a) To the psychogenic group belong those cases in which
definite emotional motivations may be found back of the criminal
behavior. For the most part they may be reached psychothera-
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peutically, sometimes with but little difficulty. Many are therefore redeemable. This group contributes the larger percentage
of habitual criminals.
b) The other group, the psychopathic, fails to reveal the
presence of psychogenic motivations and therefore can be but
little influenced psychotherapeutically. Instead of giving them
a definite sentence, they should be segregated and confined for
an indefinite period of time.
The basic tenet of this contribution is that if criminals are to
be treated effectively, they must be treated differentially on the
basis of their personality as a whole.
The Criminal Is the State's Greatest Criine.-Arim.

